[日本語 | English]
- Oleg Kiselyov (FNMOC) and Chung-chieh Shan (Rutgers)
- Bounded-rational theory of mind for conversational implicature
Game- and relevance-theoretic accounts of pragmatic reasoning often
implement Grice's maxim of Manner by penalizing utterances for their
syntactic complexity or processing effort. We propose to explain this
penalty as the risk of misinterpretation in a bounded-rational theory
of mind. The core of this explanation is to represent and execute
probabilistic models (of felicity and truth) and inference algorithms
(for resolving underspecification) in the same programming language.
The payoff is that the same cognitive machinery that the hearer uses to
decide what to do, by interpreting utterances, can also be used by the
speaker to decide what to say, by predicting how potential utterances
would be interpreted or misinterpreted by the hearer.
Last modified: 2010-04-01 10:31:39 JST