Occam’s Razor by Minimal Negation

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Abstract. Historically condito sine qua non (c.s.q.n.) has been used as a criteria to judge if a person is culpable or not, though this criteria is known to be inadequate for some cases. Thus far, we have developed a theory to decide whether a certain statement is surely caused by the given antecedents in minimal abduction. However, the theory has included several problems concerning the meanings of logical connectives such as implication and logical-or. In this study, we employ minimal negation and revise these issues. We strictly distinguish the logical implication from causality, and consider the plausible semantics for the causation by Kripke semantics.

1 Introduction

This study is motivated by condito sine qua non (c.s.q.n. hereafter), which means ‘if not’ in English, that has worked as a principle to judge causality.

“A caused B” if “if A had not happened, B would not have happened.”
(J. Glaser, 1858)

C.s.q.n. works as follows. Suppose that the lethal dose of a certain medicine is 100mg, and two persons A and B put 60mg of the medicine to a cup, respectively; when person C drank it, C died. If A had not put 60mg, C would not have died; thus, A is culpable for the death of C. So far so good; however, c.s.q.n. would turn to be inadequate in the following example. This time, the lethal dose is 100mg again, but each of A and B put 120mg to a cup, and naturally, C would die. If A had not put 120mg to the cup, would C have not die? No. Thus, A has no causal relation to the C’s death in terms of c.s.q.n though A should be culpable.

C.s.q.n is related to another principle called Occam’s razor, which states that ‘the more reasons are employed, the less plausible the result becomes.’ Namely, this principle implies the economy of reasoning, i.e., we need to find the minimal reason.

In this study, we are to propose a mechanism to find the minimal reason. But, in order to do this, we need to solve the inadequacy of such logical connective as negation, disjunction, and implication, as follows.
– Logical disjunction does not reflect the meaning of ‘or’ of natural language. We strictly distinguish the ‘or’ of meta-language from the logical connective.

– Negation in natural language should be eased to tolerate relative conflict.

– In legal reasoning, we often need to include multiple kinds of implications. We also distinguish the causal relation from the logical implication.

In our previous work, we clarified the distinction of meta-language ‘or’ and ‘∨’ [1]. In this paper, we tackle a framework to decide the minimal reason for the causal relation with *Graded Negation* [2], together with the problems of logical ‘or’ and multiple implications.

## 2 C.S.Q.N. by Minimal explanation

We have tried to formalize the framework of minimal explanation by *minimal abduction* [1]. In this section, we briefly summarize the work. Given

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ & B \text{ Background theory} \\
& H \text{ Abducibles (a set of propositional formulae)} \\
& O \text{ A propositional formula}
\end{align*}
\]

we say \(E \subseteq H\) is an *explanation* if and only if

- \(B \cup E \models O\) and \(B \cup E \not\models \bot\).
- \(E\) is *minimal* if for any \(E' \subset E\), \(B \cup E' \not\models O\).

Now, let us consider:

**Example 1**  *There is a poison, the lethal dose of which is 100 mg, though below the lethal dose it gives some medical effect. A put 60 mg of it into C’s coffee without telling C. Later, B also put another 60 mg into the same coffee without knowing A had already put the same poison. C drank the coffee and died.*

In this case, A and B’s actions caused C’s death since without either of actions, C would not have died. This example can be formalized in the following way in abduction.

\[
\begin{align*}
A_{60}: & \text{ A put 60mg, } B_{60}: \text{ B put 60mg} \\
C_{died}: & \text{ C died} \\
B = & \{A_{60} \land B_{60} \Rightarrow C_{died}\} \\
H_1 = & \{A_{60}, B_{60}\} \\
O = & C_{died}
\end{align*}
\]

When \(H_1 = \{A_{60}, B_{60}\}\), the minimal explanations of \(O\) becomes \(A_{60} \land B_{60}\) and this is the minimal cause.

**Example 2**  *A put 120 mg into C’s coffee to kill C. B put another 120 mg into the same coffee to kill C without knowing A put the same poison. C drank the coffee and died.*
In this case, we cannot say that either of A and B’s actions caused C’s death; even if there weren’t A’s deed, C would have died. The second example is formalized as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
A_{120}: & \text{ A put 120mg,} \\
B_{120}: & \text{ B put 120mg} \\
B = & \{A_{120} \supset C_{\text{died}}, B_{120} \supset C_{\text{died}}, A_{120} \land B_{120} \supset C_{\text{died}}\} \\
H_2 = & \{A_{120}, B_{120}\} \\
O = & C_{\text{died}}
\end{align*}
\]

When \(H_1 = \{A_{120}, B_{120}\}\), the minimal explanations of \(O\) becomes \(\{\{A_{120}\}, \{B_{120}\}\}\). That is, either \(A_{120}\) or \(B_{120}\) is the minimal cause. In other words, there are two minimal explanations.

**Example 3**  The inspector only found that A or B put 120mg into C’s coffee. No one knows which of the two the true culprit is.

The second example is formalized as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
B = & \{A_{120} \supset C_{\text{died}}, B_{120} \supset C_{\text{died}}\} \\
H_3 = & \{A_{120} \lor B_{120}\} \\
O = & C_{\text{died}}
\end{align*}
\]

When \(H_2 = \{A_{120} \lor B_{120}\}\), the minimal explanations of \(O\) becomes \(\{\{A_{120} \lor B_{120}\}\}\). That is, \(A_{120} \lor B_{120}\) is the minimal cause.

In this work, we have clarified the problem of disjunction of causes and disjunctive causes. However, the method of minimal explanation needs to generate a candidate explanation \(H’\) out of \(H\) rather in an ad hoc way, and does not include the process of cutting the redundant reasons off with the razor. In this study, we introduce the comparison process to decide which is less redundant.

Hereafter, to avoid notational confusion, we renounce the symbols of abduction, in which ‘\(\models\)’ has been a valid proposition and ‘\(\supset\)’ has been a logical implication. Instead, we employ ‘\(\rightarrow\)’ for the logical implication.

### 3 Why graded negation?

Let us consider a situation that is caused by multiple reasons. For simplicity, \(\delta\) is the consequence from the three precedents \(\alpha, \beta, \text{ and } \gamma\).

\[
\alpha \land \beta \land \gamma \rightarrow \delta.
\]

Suppose that there is no other implication rule which produces \(\delta\). Then, if we can deny one of the three reasons, we can expect that \(\delta\) is not deduced.

\[
\neg \alpha \text{ negates } \alpha \land \beta \land \gamma.
\]

However, in the similar way, we can deny multiple reasons.

\[
\neg \alpha \land \neg \beta \text{ negates } \alpha \land \beta \land \gamma
\]

\[
\neg \alpha \land \neg \beta \land \neg \gamma \text{ negates } \alpha \land \beta \land \gamma
\]
However, among ¬α, ¬α ∧ ¬β, and ¬α ∧ ¬β ∧ ¬γ, the latter one more strongly negates α∧β∧γ. This comparison can be applied to identify the minimal reason.

In this discussion, either ¬α, ¬β, or ¬γ is the minimal reason to negate α∧β∧γ.

Now, we briefly summarize Graded negation [2].

**Definition 1** Graded negation

\[ \Delta \vdash \neg_\alpha \beta \iff \Delta \vdash \alpha \land \alpha \land \beta \vdash \bot. \]

In this definition, α negates β in Δ; that is a weak negation, compared with the conventional negation. If \( \Delta = \{\neg_\beta, \gamma\} \) then \( \Delta \vdash \neg_\beta \) but \( \Delta \not\vdash \neg_\alpha \beta \).

Features of graded negation are summarized as follows.

- \( \Delta \vdash \neg_\alpha \beta \) implies \( \Delta \vdash \alpha \land \neg_\beta \) because α does not appear from \( \Delta \).
- Because \( \alpha \land \neg_\alpha \vdash \bot \), \( \neg_\alpha \neg_\alpha \iff \alpha \).
- Putting \( \neg_\alpha \) in the reverse way, we get \( \neg_\alpha \neg_\alpha \iff \neg_\alpha \).
- Given \( \Delta \), we cannot say \( \Delta \vdash \neg_\alpha \beta \lor \neg_\alpha \beta \) because neither \( \alpha \) nor \( \neg_\alpha \) might appear from \( \Delta \).
- However, because \( \beta \) is compatible either with \( \alpha \) or with \( \neg_\alpha \), \( \Delta \vdash \neg_\alpha \beta \lor \neg_\alpha \beta \).

Also, \( \Delta \vdash \neg_\alpha \beta \iff \Delta \vdash \alpha \) or \( \{\alpha \land \beta\} \vdash \bot \).

**Definition 2** Minimal negation

\[ \alpha \minimally \negates \delta \iff \Delta \vdash \ominus_\alpha \delta, \]

\[ \text{for any } \beta \text{ such that } \Delta \vdash \neg_\beta \delta, \text{ if } \vdash \alpha \rightarrow \beta, \text{ then } \vdash \beta \rightarrow \alpha. \]

For example, given \( \Delta = \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}, \delta = \neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \),

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta &\vdash \neg_\alpha \delta, \\
\Delta &\vdash \neg(\alpha \land \beta) \delta, \\
\Delta &\vdash \neg(\alpha \land \beta \land \gamma) \delta.
\end{align*}
\]

Namely, each of \( \alpha, \alpha \land \beta, \) and \( \alpha \land \beta \land \gamma \) negates \( \delta \). However, the negation is tolerated as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
\neg(\alpha \land \beta) &\neg(\alpha \lor \beta) : (\alpha \land \beta) \text{ strongly negates } \neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \\
\downarrow &
\neg_\alpha \neg(\alpha \lor \beta) : \alpha \text{ rather strongly negates } \neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \\
\downarrow &
\neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \neg(\alpha \lor \beta) : (\alpha \lor \beta) \text{ weakly negates } \neg(\alpha \lor \beta)
\end{align*}
\]

and \( \alpha \lor \beta \) seems to negate \( \delta \) most weakly. Now, we can assign truth values to the formulae with ‘\( \ominus \)’ in accordance with Definition 2 in the following way.

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c}
\ominus(\alpha \land \beta) \delta & \neg(\alpha \land \beta) \delta & (\alpha \land \beta) \rightarrow \alpha & \neg_\alpha \delta \hline
F & T & F & T \\
\ominus_\alpha \delta & \neg_\alpha \delta & \alpha \rightarrow (\alpha \lor \beta) & \neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \delta \hline
F & T & T & F \\
\ominus(\alpha \lor \beta) \delta & \neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \delta & (\alpha \lor \beta) \rightarrow (\alpha \lor \beta \lor \gamma) & \neg(\alpha \lor \beta \lor \gamma) \delta \\
T & T & F & F
\end{array}
\]
Thus, we can conclude that
\[ \neg((\alpha \lor \beta)) \iff \ominus((\alpha \lor \beta)) \] that is, \( \alpha \lor \beta \) minimally negates \( \neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \).

In the following section, we develop this idea; we will contend that the minimal reason to negate some statement appears at the suffix of ‘\( \ominus \)’.

4 Causality, Minimality, and Culpability

4.1 Causality and Implication

In legal reasoning, there often happens a notational confusion originated from the mixture of causality and logical implication. For example, the rule of weakening

\[
\frac{\Delta \vdash C}{\Delta \vdash \alpha \lor \beta \vdash C}
\]

is generally admitted. But, the following inference

\[
\begin{align*}
A_{120} & \quad \text{caused} \quad C_{\text{died}} \\
A_{120} \lor B_{120} & \quad \text{implies} \quad C_{\text{died}}
\end{align*}
\]

is obviously inadequate. In any occasion, there is no reason that we weaken the cause of \( C_{\text{died}} \) from \( A_{120} \) to \( A_{120} \lor B_{120} \). The transitivity between the causation and the logical implication, as well as the deduction theorem,

\[
\frac{\Gamma, A \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash (A \rightarrow B)}
\]

is meaningless if we stick to read ‘\( \vdash \)’ as causality.

From here, we syntactically distinguish the logical implication ‘\( \rightarrow \)’ from the causality. According to Lewis [6],

‘\( \alpha \) causes \( \delta \) means that when \( \alpha \) occurs \( \delta \) is more likely than \( \neg \delta \).’

We will restate this definition in Section 5 in terms of possible world semantics. As the first approximation, we state the definition in such a way that \( \neg \delta \) deduces the inconsistency, as follows.

\[ \Delta \vdash \alpha \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha \land \neg \delta \vdash \bot. \]

According to Definition 1, the above condition is exactly identical with \( \Delta \vdash \neg(\alpha \lor \neg \delta) \).

Definition 3 Causation by graded negation

In a situation \( \Delta \), \( \alpha \) causes \( \delta \) iff \( \Delta \vdash \neg(\alpha \lor \neg \delta) \).
Although $\alpha \vdash \delta$ implies $\alpha \land \neg \delta \vdash \bot$ and partially satisfies Definition 3, ‘$\vdash$’ itself is no causal relation. We will discuss the adequacy of this definition precisely, later in Section 5.

Let us consider the example of overdosing, with the following set of general rules.

$$I_1 = \{A_{60} \land B_{60} \vdash C_{died}, A_{120} \vdash C_{died}, B_{120} \vdash C_{died}\}$$

As a preliminary step, we circumscribe\(^3\) $C_{died}$ from $I_1$.

$$C_{died} \iff A_{120} \lor B_{120} \lor (A_{60} \land B_{60})$$

In the above situation, when the amount of dose goes beyond 100mg, the tragedy would occur.

$$\{A_{60}\} \not\vdash C_{died}, \quad \{A_{60}, B_{60}\} \vdash C_{died}, \quad \{A_{120}\} \vdash C_{died}, \quad \{A_{120}, B_{120}\} \vdash C_{died}.$$  

Now, in the situation that both of $A$ and $B$ put 120mg of dose respectively, which is the minimal reason of the death of $C$? First, because $\{A_{120}, B_{120}\} \vdash A_{120} \land B_{120}$ and $A_{120} \land B_{120} \land C_{died} \vdash \bot$,

$$\{A_{120}, B_{120}\} \vdash \neg (A_{120} \land B_{120}) \neg C_{died}.$$  

However, how can we tolerate the condition of $C$’s death? Because in the similar reasoning process under $\{A_{120}, B_{120}\}$

$$\vdash \neg A_{120} \neg C_{died}, \quad \vdash \neg B_{120} \neg C_{died}, \quad \text{and} \quad \vdash \neg (A_{120} \lor B_{120}) \neg C_{died}.$$  

we can conclude that

$$\not\vdash \ominus (A_{120} \land B_{120}) \neg C_{died}, \quad \not\vdash \ominus A_{120} \neg C_{died}, \quad \text{and} \quad \vdash \ominus (A_{120} \lor B_{120}) \neg C_{died}.$$  

That is, $A_{120} \lor B_{120}$ is the minimal reason for $C_{died}$.

Thus, when we negate $\alpha \land \beta \land \gamma$, given a certain set of propositions $\Delta$,

$$\begin{cases} 
\Delta \vdash \neg \neg \alpha \land \beta \land \gamma, \\
\Delta \vdash \neg \neg \alpha \lor \neg \beta \land \gamma, \\
\Delta \vdash \ominus (\neg \alpha \lor \neg \beta \lor \neg \gamma) \land \alpha \land \beta \land \gamma.
\end{cases}$$  

However, we cannot tolerate the negation by arbitrary formula $\delta$, as

$$\begin{cases} 
\Delta \vdash \neg \neg \alpha \land \beta \land \gamma, \\
\Delta \not\vdash \neg \neg \alpha \lor \neg \beta \land \gamma, \\
\Delta \not\vdash \ominus (\neg \alpha \lor \neg \beta \lor \neg \gamma) \land \alpha \land \beta \land \gamma.
\end{cases}$$  

because $\neg (\alpha \land \delta) \land (\alpha \land \beta \land \gamma) \not\vdash \bot$.

\(^3\) Given multiple clauses that defines $\varphi$, circumscription add such a new statement that $\varphi \to \cdots$ [3]. This circumscription is not obligatory and is just for clarification. In this paper, we would like to explicitly show the disjunctive causes of $C_{died}$ to be compared with the suffix of ‘$\neg$’, to present how graded negation works.
4.2 Minimality and Culpability

The minimal reason is a logical consequence and can be the result of Occam’s razor with which we could excise redundant reasons. However, this result does not always reflect if a person is culpable or not. For example, although

\[ \{A_{120}, B_{120}\} \vdash \neg (A_{120} \lor B_{120}) \quad \neg \text{died}, \]

this does not explain that the individual A is still accusable, regardless of B’s deed of B_{120}. In order to judge if A (or B) is accusable or not, we need to provide the second step of judgement. For this purpose, we put an arbitrary proposition Q in a given situation \( \Delta \) in the following place.

\[ \Delta \vdash Q \land \neg \text{died}? \]

that is, ‘are Q and \( \neg \text{died} \) compatible in situation \( \Delta \)?’ This procedure is to put Q in the place of cause in Definition 3.

Now, we will revisit the examples of Section 2 and analyse them in the way of minimal negation.

**Example 1** In this case, only when \( A_{60} \land B_{60}, C \) would be dead. Thus,

\[ \{A_{60}, B_{60}\} \vdash \neg (A_{60} \land B_{60}) \quad \neg \text{died}. \]

How should the query \( \vdash A_{60} \land \neg \text{died} \) be answered? Although \( \{A_{60}, B_{60}\} \vdash A_{60}, \{A_{60}, B_{60}\} \vdash \neg A_{60} \quad \neg \text{died}, \) i.e., as \( A_{60} \land B_{60} \) is the minimal reason which cannot be tolerated to \( A_{60} \). Thus, the answer to the query becomes no. Namely, the deed of \( A_{60} \) is a partial cause of \( \text{died} \). However, \( A \) cannot be blamed unless (s)he knows B would put another 60mg. That is, we need to know the epistemic states of A and B, to judge if \( A \) is accusable or not.

**Example 2** Because

\[ \{A_{120}, B_{120}\} \vdash A_{120}, \quad \neg (A_{120} \lor B_{120}) \quad \neg \text{died}, \quad \text{and} \quad A_{120} \rightarrow A_{120} \lor B_{120}, \]

we can conclude \( \{A_{120}, B_{120}\} \vdash \neg A_{120} \quad \neg \text{died}, \) that is, \( \{A_{120}, B_{120}\} \not\vdash A_{120} \land \neg \text{died}. \) A is accusable.

**Example 3** In this case, the minimal reason becomes \( A_{120} \lor B_{120} \) too, that is,

\[ \{A_{120} \lor B_{120}\} \vdash \neg (A_{120} \lor B_{120}) \quad \neg \text{died}. \]

However, \( \{A_{120} \lor B_{120}\} \not\vdash A_{120} \). That is, \( \{A_{120} \lor B_{120}\} \not\vdash A_{120} \land \neg \text{died}, \) i.e., \( A \) is not accusable yet.

5 Lewis’ Causation and the Analysis of ‘or’

When we cannot know either A or B put 120mg of medicine into the cup, we should write as
On the contrary, when we can obtain two possible solutions,  

(A put 120mg) or (B put 120mg).

This opposition can be restated by the issue of scope of predicates. However, in the former case, we cannot provide ‘or’ inside a predicate as put_120(A or B).

One idea for us to represent such ‘or’ is to employ modal operators. The ‘or’ in knowledge, belief, and perception contexts is known to be decomposable [4]; e.g., “Ann knows that Betty or Chris won the race” does not imply “Ann knows that Betty won the race”, nor “that Chris won the race.” Employing a modal operator $K_A$ meaning ‘agent $A$ knows that,’ we can represent the distinction. In our case,  

$K_A(A_{120} \lor B_{120}) \nRightarrow K_A A_{120} \lor K_A B_{120}$.

While the former claims that the cause is $A_{120}$ or $B_{120}$, the latter says that either the cause is $A_{120}$, or the cause is $B_{120}$. With Kripke semantics (possible world semantics), $K_A \varphi$ holds in a certain world $w$ if and only if $\varphi$ holds in all the possible worlds accessible from $w$ [5], given an accessibility relation $R$. Thus, the decomposability is explained as follows.

$w \models K_A(\varphi \lor \psi) \iff \forall w'(w Rw'), w' \models \varphi$ or $w' \models \psi$

$w \models K_A \varphi \lor K_A \psi \iff \forall w'(w Rw'), w' \models \varphi$ or $\forall w''(w Rw''), w'' \models \psi$

The formalization by $K_A$ may resolve the problem of epistemic state in Example 1 as well as the decomposability of logical disjunction. However, to present a modal logic with full axiomatization and/or with full sequent system is far beyond the current scope. In this paper, we only utilize a part of possible world semantics concerning Lewis’ causality, and discuss the future possibility later.

From a practical point of view, we introduce the either-or as follows. In a certain knowledge state $w$,

$w \models (\varphi \bullet \psi \vdash \chi) \iff \text{either } w \models (\varphi \vdash \chi) \text{ or } w \models (\psi \vdash \chi). \quad (1)$

Hereafter, we employ the possible world semantics of the above equation, to give the definition of causation [7, 8], that is,

“A $\vdash B$ if and only if the world(s) in which $A \land B$ holds is closer to the real world than the world(s) in which $A \land \neg B$ holds, when possible worlds are partitioned by the plausibility.”

Considering the conventional definition of logical disjunction ($\lor$)

$w \models \varphi \lor \psi \iff w \models \varphi \text{ or } w \models \psi,$

we develop the semantics of ‘$\bullet$’ as follows.

$w \models \varphi \bullet \psi \iff w \models \varphi \land \neg \psi \text{ or } w \models \neg \varphi \land \psi. \quad (2)$
Now, given a usual triplet of Kripke frame \((W, R, \models)\) where \(W\) is a set of possible worlds, \(R\) is the accessibility relation between worlds, and \(\models\) is the valuation, we augment it to the quadruple \((W, R, \models, \leq)\) where \(\leq\) is the partition of possible worlds; i.e. \(w_1 \leq w_2\) implies that \(w_1\) is more plausible than \(w_2\). Then, we give the semantics of ‘\(\vdash\)’ according to Lewis’ definition.

**Definition 4**  
{
Causation by plausibility  
\(w \models (\alpha \vdash \beta)\) if and only if 
\(\forall w' (wRw') w' \models \alpha \land \beta\) and \(\forall w'' (wRw'') w'' \models \alpha \land \neg \beta, w' \leq w''.\)

Combining (2) and Definition 4, we obtain the semantics of 
\(w \models (\varphi \bullet \psi \vdash \chi)\)
as follows.
\[
\forall w' (wRw') w' \models \varphi \land \neg \psi \land \chi \text{ or } w' \models \neg \varphi \land \psi \land \chi, \text{ and } \\
\forall w'' (wRw'') w'' \models \varphi \land \neg \psi \land \neg \chi \text{ or } w'' \models \neg \varphi \land \psi \land \neg \chi,
\]

Namely,
\[
\forall w' (wRw') w' \models \varphi \land \neg \psi \land \chi \text{ or } w' \models \neg \varphi \land \psi \land \chi \text{ and } \\
\forall w'' (wRw'') w'' \models \varphi \land \neg \psi \land \neg \chi \text{ or } w'' \models \neg \varphi \land \psi \land \neg \chi, \quad (3)
\]

At this stage, there have appeared four classes of possible worlds.
\[
w_1 \models \varphi \land \neg \psi \land \chi \\
w_2 \models \neg \varphi \land \psi \land \chi \\
w_3 \models \varphi \land \neg \psi \land \neg \chi \\
w_4 \models \neg \varphi \land \psi \land \neg \chi
\]
we can compare \(w_1\) and \(w_3\), and \(w_2\) and \(w_4\) in terms of the plausibility partition; however, we cannot do so between \(w_1\) and \(w_4\), and \(w_2\) and \(w_3\), because there are no common valuation among the three propositions. Therefore, (3) results in
\[
\forall w' (wRw') w' \models \varphi \land \chi \text{ and } \forall w'' (wRw'') w'' \models \varphi \land \neg \chi, w' \leq w'', \text{ or } \\
\forall w'' (wRw'') w'' \models \psi \land \chi \text{ and } \forall w''' (wRw''') w''' \models \psi \land \neg \chi, w'' \leq w'''.
\]

Getting back to Definition 4, we obtain
\[
w \models (\varphi \vdash \chi) \text{ or } w \models (\psi \vdash \chi),
\]
that is (1).

Below, we first revise the solution of Example 3 using either-or, and then we introduce a more complicated example.
Example 3 (revised) Either A or B put 120mg of the medicine into the coffee cup.

The situation is formalized as

\{ A_{120} \bullet B_{120} \} \vdash C_{\text{died}}.

According to (1),

either \{ A_{120} \} \vdash C_{\text{died}} or \{ B_{120} \} \vdash C_{\text{died}},

and in each case, in some possible worlds \( w \) and \( w' \),

\{ A_{120} \} \vdash \neg C_{\text{died}} in \( w \) or
\{ B_{120} \} \vdash \neg C_{\text{died}} in \( w' \).

Example 4 The inspector found that A put 60mg of the medicine to the C’s cup, and in addition B put either 60mg or 120mg. C died.

Now, we expand the general rules as follows.

\( \Gamma_2 = \Gamma_1 \cup \{ A_{60} \land B_{120} \vdash C_{\text{died}} \} \),

when \( C_{\text{died}} \) is circumscribed as

\( C_{\text{died}} \leftrightarrow A_{120} \lor B_{120} \lor (A_{60} \land B_{60}) \lor (A_{60} \land B_{120}) \).

Then, the situation becomes

\{ A_{60}, (B_{60} \bullet B_{120}) \} \vdash C_{\text{died}}.

Because possible worlds are classified into the following two classes

\( w_1 \models A_{60} \land B_{60} \) and \( w_2 \models A_{60} \land B_{120} \),

Thus,

\( A_{60} \land (B_{60} \bullet B_{120}) = (A_{60} \land B_{60}) \bullet (A_{60} \land B_{120}) \).

Namely, the either-or is decomposable in knowledge-base. This time, the minimal negation works as follows. Below, we omit the left-hand side of ‘\( \vdash \)’.

\( \vdash \neg (A_{60} \land (B_{60} \lor B_{120})) \neg C_{\text{died}}, \)
\( \vdash \neg (A_{60} \land B_{60}) \neg C_{\text{died}}, \)
\( \vdash \neg (A_{60} \land B_{120}) \neg C_{\text{died}}, \)
\( \vdash \neg B_{120} \neg C_{\text{died}}. \)

By the chains of logical strength

\( A_{60} \land B_{120} \rightarrow B_{120} \)

\( A_{60} \land (B_{60} \bullet B_{120}) \)

\( \neg A_{60} \land B_{60} \)
only \((A_{60} \land B_{60})\) and \(B_{120}\) cannot be eased furthermore; thus, we can conclude

\[\vdash \ominus (A_{60} \land B_{60}) \neg \text{died}, \quad \text{and} \]
\[\vdash \ominus B_{120} \neg \text{died}.\]

As this example, multiple minimal reasons may exist.

6 Conclusion

In this study, we have employed minimal negation and proposed a theory to find the minimal reason for a causation structure. The superability of this method is that we can compare two reasons directly and thus can put them in order as to which is stronger/weaker reasons.

The motivation of this study was how we could tune such logical connectives as negation, implication, and disjunction, to the meanings of practical reasoning. Employing the graded negation, we could relativize the notion of negation. We have defined the causality first by the minimal negation and have strictly distinguished the causal relation from the logical implication. We have discussed the adequacy of the definition in terms of possible world semantics (Kripke semantics), and by this, we have distinguished the semantics of ‘or’ in knowledge space from that of logical disjunction.

We have distinguished the minimality of reason from the culpability in Section 4.2. However, in order to judge if a person is accusable, we need to consider his/her knowledge state and/or intention. In Example 1, if \(B\) had known that \(A\) had put 60mg already \(B\) would be accusable; otherwise \(B\) would be innocent.

As we have discussed in Section 5, we need to develop our theory to include such epistemic operators in future.

References